Statistical adjustment is a ubiquitous practice in all quantitative fields that is meant to correct for improprieties or limitations in observed data
estimate consequences of human decisions, such as prescribing a medicine or enacting a law. 3 Without regular and reliable measures of this kind, we would be blind to the prevailing conditions of the population, and unable to make rational decisions to improve the length and quality of life for members of the society. 4 Statistics serves a fundamental role in this endeavor, providing a science for understanding the relation between samples and the populations from which they derive, and for describing variability in observations and modeling this variability to understand aspects of structure, mechanism, causal effect and attribution. Such inferences are essential not only for understanding our world as it exists, but also for making predictions about the future. They are essential for adjudicating disputes that rest on issues of distributive justice, since attribution is a function of causal theories. 5 A basic activity of statisticians and their related professions (e.g. epidemiologists, demographers, and quantitative social scientists) is to relate observations from random samples to the unobserved quantities in the total population, and to build models that relate measures to one another in the form of associations. 6 We estimate parameters that have a magnitude, such as the average measurement in a group, or the correlation between two factors. This is generally some function of the individual data points that summarizes information into a single value that represents the aggregate quantity of interest. There is also a variance, which represents something about the distribution of data points across the sample or across the population. 7 When a random sample of values is observed and we wish to make inferences about the value of a quantity of interest in the whole population, the variance of the summary across repeated samples tells us something about how much uncertainty is attributable to sample selection. 8 For example, if we poll ten randomly selected citizens about their support for a political party, we should know less securely the true level of population support than if we randomly poll 100 citizens. This additional uncertainly due to the smaller sample is revealed by a larger variance of the observed proportion over repeated samples.
A key conceptual foundation of statistics is the notion of the distribution, which is a mathematical depiction of the frequency of observations. 9 Recognizing phenomena and processes that follow defined distributions is a routine aspect of statistical inference, since the distribution has a precise mathematical expression as a function of specified parameters. 10 For example, coin flips follow a "binomial distribution," controlled by a parameter referring to the probability of observing a "heads," as well as a number of times the coin is flipped. From these two numbers we can define the variance of the count of heads, or the variance around an estimate of a population 3 MUTUAL CONSTRUCTION OF STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 66 ("Statistics has become, at least in some forms of practice, the epistemic flagship of the modern sciences -be it in biology, physics, informatics, or sociology."). 4 10 Id. at 240 ("A discrete probability distribution function has two characteristics: 1. Each probability is between zero and one, inclusive. 2. The sum of the probabilities is one.").
proportion based on a small sample. Once a distribution has been defined as a process that gave rise to the data observed, then the individual observations can be smoothed into summaries that have defined expectations and variances, and the relations between quantities will also have defined characteristics.
11 Models for the relations between quantities can then become increasingly elaborated with assumptions, such as linearity or independence, where these are convenient for smoothing over noisy patterns, or extrapolating over regions with few observations. 12 II. ADJUSTED STATISTICS When samples are randomly selected, the resulting summaries and associations refer to the real world of the population from which the samples were drawn. Often, however, we adjust these estimates in some way, perturbing the estimated value in a specific way to make it more relevant or useful in some sense. Such adjustments are a major occupation within the science of statistics, with the simple depiction of the "raw" or "crude" values considered to be rather trivial.
13 Browsing through the journals of statistics, epidemiology, or related fields, one will find that most of the techniques described are new or improved methods for making such adjustments.
14 If we make an analogy between statistics and cooking, then obtaining the crude values is something like grocery shopping, a necessary process, but not the least bit glamorous. The real art and marvel of the craft of cooking, however, is expertly combining and modifying the ingredients, drawing out flavors, and modifying textures. This is adjustment.
Adjustments can be performed to address some impropriety in the sampling or measurement, toward a more accurate portrayal of the real world population from which the samples were drawn.
15 This is the case, for example, with adjustments to the census to address population undercounts, 16 with adjustments that are made to correct for measurement error in nutritional surveys, 17 or for the impact of missing data due to respondents who are lost during follow-up. 18 More commonly, however, the adjustment conducted by the statistician is not to improve the depiction of the real world, but rather to depict a quantity in an imaginary world. 19 It is the crude observation that reflects the events that occurred in the real world, but this number may be deemed less relevant to some hypothetical question, therefore justifying the adjustment.
11 Sander Greenland, Summarization, Smoothing, and Inference in Epidemiologic Analysis, 21 SCANDINAVIAN J. SOC. MED. 227, 228 (1993) ("Smoothing is usually viewed as the combination of data with a model to obtain data expected under the model -more precisely, the data one should expect to see in a replicate of the study if the model is correct and the replication is perfect with respect to all identified study and subject characteristics.").
12 Id. at 230. 13 In fact, while routine statistical surveillance such as reported by government agencies may be presented as crude frequencies in order to best depict the real world, all etiologic or causal estimates are based on hypothetical conditions, since the question is inherently a "what if" construction rather than a "what is" construction.
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For example, the question of whether smoking causes lung cancer is essentially a contrast between the risk of lung cancer for an individual if she smokes compared to the risk for that same individual if she doesn't smoke. As such, one half of this contrast is always unobserved, a fact that has been dubbed " [t] he fundamental problem of causal inference . . . ."
21 At the aggregate level, if we observe a sample that is a mix of smokers and non-smokers, and we ask what would be the lung cancer rate if they had all smoked versus if none of them had smoked, then both parts of this contrast are unobserved.
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Even for surveillance, it is often the case that the hypothetical world is more interesting or relevant in some way than the factual world. The most common example of this is age standardization, which is a routine adjustment in nearly all vital statistics reporting, despite the fact that it refers to imaginary populations when the presumed goal is depiction of actual event frequencies. 23 Consider the following example from Schoenbach and Rosamond, shown in Appendix Table 1, comparing deaths per 1,000 white women per year in Miami, Alaska, and the United States. 24 The true mortality observed in Miami was 8.92 deaths per 1,000 in that year, compared to an observed rate of 2.67 deaths per 1,000 in Alaska. 25 The United States as a whole experienced 8.13 deaths per 1,000.
26 Barring any misclassifications of vital status, race or gender, these numbers represent the true summary, but in many ways not the most interesting one.
The nuisance in this case is the age structure. From the summary numbers, it appears to be much safer to live in Alaska, where only a third as many white women die each year, but this is an artifact of a very different age structure in the two populations, also depicted in Appendix Table 1. 27 Indeed, by looking at the death rate within each age group, it can be observed immediately that the mortality rates are approximately the same between Miami and Alaska. 28 The overall death rate in Miami is higher simply because there is a greater proportion of old people in Miami and old people die at a higher rate. 29 The judgment that the crude rate is an inadequate summary, therefore rests on the notion that Miami should not be punished in its assessment simply for having more elderly residents, since the age-stratified mortality is comparable. The value judgment underlying this discomfort is that age is a permissible cause of mortality, and therefore should be extracted from the summary so we don't mix the effect of age with the effect of location. A key insight is that all statistical adjustments require a value judgment concerning differences that are 20 See id. at 541. 21 permissible and those that are impermissible, in order to eliminate the nuisance of the first category and focus on the disparity due to the second category.
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The traditional solution in this case is age-standardization, in which a new summary is constructed as a weighted average of the stratum-specific rates, with weights taken from a "standard" reference population, such as the entire United States in 1970. 31 We apply the same set of weights to the age-specific rates of Alaska and Miami so that the summary (age-adjusted) death rate will be independent of differences in the age distribution of the two populations. This is arguably a more interesting and relevant comparison, but it must be remembered that this adjusted summary estimate is no longer an observation about the real world. Rather, the adjusted rates represent the crude death rates that Miami and Alaska would have experienced if they had both had (counter to fact) the same age distribution as the 1970 U.S. white female population. The new adjusted rate is a fiction, but a convenient one because it removes the distorting effect of a nuisance covariate to allow a "fairer" comparison of the death rates. Applying the formula above, we obtain agestandardized death rates for Miami equal to 6.92 per 1,000, and for Alaska equal to 6.71 per 1,000. These are approximately the same, and reveal that one location is not more dangerous than the other, and in fact that both match very closely to the United States as a whole. In this way the adjusted contrast reveals that although many more white women died in Miami than in Alaska, a more informative comparison of these rates shows that at any given age, risk is not elevated importantly in either location.
The ubiquitous application of such adjustments should not obscure the fact that the adjusted rates are imaginary. They can be easily changed by altering something as arbitrary as the standard population that is chosen to provide the weights. An impressive example of this phenomenon is provided by Krieger and Williams. 32 After decades of using the 1970 census as the standard population in U.S. official statistics, it was President George W. Bush's administration that oversaw the switch to the new 2000 standard after the census of that year became available. 33 Because the U.S. population in 2000 was substantially older than it was in 1970, older age strata were subsequently given more weight in the standardization formula. 34 For somewhat artifactual reasons, racial, and socioeconomic disparities tend to be more modest in older populations when measured using ratios. 35 Therefore, the result of the switch in the reference populations to an older standard was that it reduced all reported disparities overnight. 36 This resulted in the Bush administration reporting an immediate reduction in disparities under their watch, even though this arose from a statistical procedure rather than any actual improvement for any individual. 
III. PERMISSIBLE AND IMPERMISSIBLE FACTORS
The normative value that older people can be expected to die more frequently than younger people seems difficult to contest, but agreeing on a list of permissible variables quickly becomes more difficult once we go beyond age and sex. As an example, consider an analysis of the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), published by the Urban Institute in 2015. 38 The NAEP is a standardized test regularly administered to a nationally-representative sample of U.S. students, and there are crude average test scores available for each state. 39 The primary interest of the Urban Institute, however, is on the role of state educational policy in making improvements to student performance. 40 They argue that this assessment of state policy is not directly-observable from the crude test scores because of demographic differences between states, such as the proportion of students in poverty or the proportion that are black.
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The Urban Institute therefore calculated adjusted NAEP scores, based on the 2013 results, to account for these differences in ostensibly permissible factors. 42 Louisiana, for example, actually performed 47th out of 50, but its adjusted rank was 27th. 43 Likewise, Texas ranked 3rd in the nation after adjustment, despite a true performance that ranked 32nd. 44 In the adjusted world, Texas and Louisiana vastly outperformed California and Michigan, with the interpretation that this analysis makes more relevant comparisons that are balanced on race and poverty in a way that the real world is not. 45 Just as Miami was not to be punished in the previous example for having more elderly residents, the same logic suggests that Texas should not be punished for having more Hispanics, or Louisiana for having more blacks. 46 From the perspective of evaluating the success or failure of a state's education policy, this seems sensible. Each state must educate the students that reside there, whether poor or minority or whatever other characteristics they have. But when one considers Louisiana a success, accounting for their demographic challenges, despite being in objective terms at the very bottom, one risks normalizing the expectation that poor and minority kids should perform poorly. If these differences are accepted as permissible, it removes those factors from critical scrutiny, conditioning away any inequality attributable to them as a given, or as a mere nuisance or artifact. Like the photographer's adjustment that can hide an ugly blemish, statistical adjustment, too, can sweep many unpleasant realities under the carpet where they are no longer seen.
While statistical adjustments in the context of disparities research are notoriously problematic because of controversies over which covariates are deemed permissible 40 CHINGOS, supra note 38, at 1. 41 Id. at 3. Note that the label "blacks" is used in this paper to refer to African Americans, and "whites" to European Americans. Where some of the papers referenced have used other terminology, I have generally converted the terminology to these labels for reasons of simplicity and consistency. In all cases, the terms refer to self-identified groups within the United States. 42 Id. at 4. 43 Id. at app. A, 
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and how to interpret adjusted estimates, 47 there has been remarkably little formalization of this problem in the statistics literature itself. A notable exception is a rather remarkable paper by Duan et al. in which this problem is delineated and explored, and which shows the paradigm to be considerably more challenging than routine application would suggest. 48 Focusing on disparities in the provision and receipt of clinical services, the authors cite an Institute of Medicine (IOM) report which defines such disparities as differences in the quality of health care that are not due to "access-related factors or clinical needs, preference, and appropriateness of intervention." 49 The intent here is obviously to remove from consideration any factors that are outside the control of the healthcare provider. The authors note that the definition is explicitly causal, by requiring attention to what is due and what is not due to various factors. 50 It is also explicitly value-laden, because it considers as relevant for policy intervention only differences that are due to some kind of inappropriate or unjustifiable discrimination on the part of the clinician. 51 That different populations might have varying access to care or unequal needs is off the table for the purposes of this question.
Duan and colleagues then propose a statistical framework in which the covariates of interest have been classified into "allowable" and "non-allowable" categories with respect to a specific research goal. 52 Allowable covariates are considered to be a justifiable cause of difference and hence should be statistically adjusted away before reporting a disparity. 53 One then only reports a disparity due to the remaining nonallowable covariates, a disparity which is different from what exists in the real world, but is what would be observed in an imaginary world in which all allowable factors were balanced between groups. 54 For example, if an outcome is affected by tastes and preferences, it is allowable, so that a person who is obese simply because he enjoys eating is not considered disparate. If an outcome is affected by constraints and barriers that defy the will of the individual, however, then it is not allowable, such as a person who is obese because healthy food is not readily available in his neighborhood. Obviously there are many practical problems in defining this demarcation, not least of which is the need to know the causes of this individual's obesity. Then there is the values-laden task of separating these causes into those that are permissible, and those that represent some moral affront. Whether such a consensus around this demarcation can actually be achieved is unclear, and even more worrisome is that these justifications are seldom described explicitly in an analysis. Most often, authors simply provide a list of control variables with no justification whatsoever. 55 See, e.g., Greenland, supra note 5 (using examples of control group patients without providing justification); Keiding & Clayton, supra note 13 (controlling for variables in order to make comparisons, but failing to provide justification for comparison); Eric J. Tchetgen Tchetgen, Identification and Estimation of Even more troublesome is that this distinction should ideally vary from study to study, depending on the specific scientific goals. So for example, although the Institute of Medicine considered inequality in access to care to be permissible in their investigation of disparities at the point of care, inequality in access to care should not be permissible to an investigator of health services systems. 56 The distinction is rooted in some notion of blame, which is extra-scientific, i.e. a moral or ethical judgment based on values. Statistical adjustment is simply the tool by which we avoid blaming individuals or institutions for factors that are understood to be in some way outside of their control or irrelevant to narrow considerations of justice and equity. As such, it is rather remarkable that these decisions go almost completely unexamined in biomedical and social science publications.
A more profound technical concern raised by Duan and colleagues is that since the adjustment is based on an explicitly causal model, it must also respect the causal order of the variables, because if X causes Y, then one cannot logically condition on a fixed value of Y while varying X. 57 For example, if we ask what is the effect of lifelong heavy smoking versus lifelong non-smoking only among ninety year old men, the question is impossible to answer in any simple way, because there will be fewer ninety year old men if the group is assigned to smoke instead of not smoke. 58 In this way, adjustments not only create an imaginary population, but potentially one that is not even plausibly observed if it defies the natural relations between factors. Thus for allowable variables X A and non-allowable variables X N , a major point of the Duan et al paper is to show that modeled disparities can be very different if we consider that X A can affect X N (in which case a conditional disparity must be modeled) or if X N can affect X A (in which case a marginal disparity must be modeled). 59 The appropriate formula for the marginal disparity is actually rather complicated, and not widely known. Therefore, most researchers are implicitly assuming X A causes X N , but probably without being aware of the distinction. This may often be true, but certainly not always. For example, it may be that access to care (X A ) affects blood pressure (X N ), but if high blood pressure leads to stroke, then this may in turn hinder access to care in the future. In this case, the adjusted disparity reported is not the one that would really be observed under a true intervention to eliminate non-allowed inequalities. Duan et al give worked examples in which the adjusted disparity changes direction based on the marginal versus conditional distinction. 60 
IV. MALADJUSTED STATISTICS
Two additional examples taken from the recent racial disparities literature help to illustrate these concerns as they arise in practice. The first is a new study by Beavis and colleagues on racial disparities in age-standardized cervical cancer mortality in the United States. 63 The authors observed that previously published surveillance of this inequality had not taken into consideration the race-specific prevalence of hysterectomy, a procedure which removes women from the population at risk. 64 The logic is rather unimpeachable: just as men are not included in the denominator because they lack a cervix, women who have had a hysterectomy are also not at risk for cervical cancer, and therefore should also be removed from the risk pool. 65 The authors therefore obtained data on the prevalence of hysterectomy for adult women from a nationally representative survey, stratified by age, state, year and race.
66 Because person-time not at risk was subtracted from the denominator of the rates, the resulting values were higher for both races after correction. 67 For black women, this changed the age-standardized rate from 5.7 to 10.1 per 100,000 per year, and for white women from 3.2 to 4.7 per 100,000 per year. 68 Thus, without the correction, the racial mortality disparity was underestimated by forty-four percent. Previously reported racial disparities for this outcome were severely underestimated, and the magnitude of this discrepancy also increased with age, because hysterectomy prevalence increases with age, and rises more steeply in black women than in white women. 69 The analysis is expertly conducted and reported, but the authors never consider the ramifications of defining hysterectomy as a permissible covariate that should be adjusted away. Why should there be such a profound racial disparity in this procedure in the first place? 70 The published analysis shifts attention away from this aspect of the problem and focuses on the narrower question of what proportion of women with a cervix end up dying of cervical cancer. 71 This ignores the indisputable fact that hysterectomy does really prevent the outcome. The higher rate of hysterectomy in black women is not an artifact, but a real part of the complete picture of racial disparity. Taking this to the extreme to make the point, imagine that hysterectomy were performed on 100% of black women. This would drive the cervical cancer mortality rate in this group to zero, and the racial disparity would be reversed. Obviously this is not a desirable outcome, however, because this specific method of preventing the disease has other adverse consequences. 72 Nonetheless, the tangible implications of hysterectomy policy for cervical cancer and the clear racial disparity in interest in this instance is the race of the subject, and the authors have adjusted for variables that measure severity of disease. 100 That severity of disease is affected by patient race is the entire premise of the paper, making this adjustment completely illogical. 101 The crude data show that blacks are observed to have more severe asthmatic disease but no difference in pattern of airway inflammation compared to whites. 102 Trying to interpret the adjusted model, we can only conclude that if blacks could be forced to have equal severity of disease, then their pattern of airway inflammation would have to become more eosinophilic. This in no way corresponds to the scientific question that was posed, nor to any other question of potential interest.
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Consider this analogy. Suppose that we are interested in why whites have a higher acceptance rate for admission to Harvard University than blacks, and we want to know if this is because of a racial disparity in academic performance. In our crude data we happen to observe no correlation between race and academic performance, which would seem to provide a negative answer to our original question. But instead of stopping there, we make a statistical model in which we adjust the relationship between race and academic performance for attendance at Harvard, where blacks are greatly underrepresented. Among the students attending Harvard, we find that it would have to be the case that whites must have had higher academic performance, since this is the only way for the statistical model to boost their predicted admission status above that of blacks. Now imagine that we publish a paper claiming to have discovered that whites have higher academic performance and this explains their greater numbers in the Harvard class, even though this was not true in the data. This would be incredibly disingenuous, and yet it is exactly what these authors have done in the asthma paper. 104 Sadly, this is not an atypical example. 100 See supra text accompanying notes 89-90. 101 ur analysis relied mostly on a single assessment of airway inflammation using induced sputum. Although induced sputum is a direct and noninvasive measure of airway inflammation, other measures, including blood eosinophil counts, exhaled nitric oxide levels, and total serum IgE levels, have been associated with greater asthma severity, yet have not consistently been shown to predict ICS treatment responsiveness to the same degree as sputum eosinophils have. Blood eosinophil counts and total serum IgE levels were measured in a subset of patients in this analysis. No difference was found in blood eosinophil counts, although African American subjects had significantly higher total serum IgE levels compared with white subjects. Larger studies examining additional measures of airway inflammation, such as blood eosinophil counts, activated airway eosinophil counts, exhaled nitric oxide levels, and total serum IgE levels, should be pursued to fully address airway inflammatory differences that might exist in African American and white patients with asthma.").
103 See Nyenhuis et al., supra note 79, at 2. 104 A numerical example of this phenomenon may make the point more concretely. For the 3 variables race (1=black; 0=white), high vs low academic performance (1 vs. 0) and admission to Harvard (1 vs. 0) in that order, suppose that the 8 cells of the 2x2x2 tables are: 1,1,1=20; 1,0,1=5; 1,1,0=20; 1,0,0=20; 0,1,1=44; 0,0,1=20; 0,1,0=20 and 0,0,0=20. In this case, high academic performance is a cause of getting into Harvard (OR=2.6), Black race impedes Harvard admission (OR=0.4), and academic performance is completely uncorrelated with race (OR=1). Nonetheless, when one considers only those students who are attending Harvard, then odds of high academic performance must by eighty percent higher in whites to explain their excess. In the causal inference literature, this phenomenon is known as "collider stratification bias. What have we learned from thinking carefully through the nature of statistical adjustment and reviewing these two examples? Even before considering adjustments, crude contrasts require various analytic decisions, such as whether rates are to be contrasted as differences or as ratios. These can produce profoundly different patterns, leading some critics to complain that the nature of a disparity is inherently ambiguous even in the real world. 105 Once we move from the real world to the hypothetical world, however, the number of decisions becomes overwhelming, and yet the basis on which these are made is seldom articulated clearly in published reports. Whether the particular imaginary population invoked by the adjustments is really optimal for some particular scientific or policy question is too rarely challenged. Most published studies, like the asthma study discussed above, list a set of covariates for adjustment without any explanation offered for why these are included and why others are excluded. 106 In the statistical literature, there do exist formal guidelines for obtaining an optimal covariate set, although there is not universal agreement on how these criteria are best operationalized. 107 The derivation of these principles often rests on the analogy of an experiment, in which individuals are randomly assigned to receive one treatment or another, and therefore presents some difficulties for non-manipulable characteristics such as race. 108 Various authors have discussed the interpretation of adjusted racial disparities models, but no broad consensus has emerged in practice. 109 For the consumers of published findings, whether journalists or health professionals or policy makers, the adjustment process is too often seen as a mysterious "black box" that is seldom pried open. The adjusted results are considered somehow stronger, or more credible than the crude results, perhaps based on broad appreciation for the mantra that "association is not causation". 110 Sadly, there seems to be a reflexive acceptance of the notion that adjusted association is causation, or at least some kind of improvement. There is not nearly enough appreciation for the myriad ways in which adjustment can lead one further astray. 111 More importantly, there is not nearly enough attention to using adjustment purposefully to create the imaginary world that is most relevant to the scientific question, and thus to a recognition that these adjustments are those that would pertain in a world that is not our real world. Too often, as in the two examples shown above, the language used implies that the adjusted estimate is what was observed, when in fact the truth is that the adjusted estimate is what would have been observed under some imaginary circumstances. 112 It is the responsibility of the author to justify these imaginary circumstances as more scientifically relevant than those of the real world. their model, but they are using this to predict disease status, and they assert that knowing who actually gets disease in the real world would be "gratuitous and unnecessary."
123 This is a remarkable perspective on science, and ought to lead to sober contemplation of what we are really hoping to accomplish with our research products.
The revered statistician George E.P. Box is well known for having observed that all models are wrong, but that some are useful. 124 If we are to be scientists who aspire to have some positive impact on the real world in which we live, it is incumbent on us to articulate exactly how our models are useful. Since models inevitably describe imaginary circumstances, it is our responsibility to draw the connection back to reality, i.e. motivating and justifying adjustments for what they tell us about the real world, not what they tell us about the world of the model in which none of us live. Making the explicit justification for why a model is useful will often highlight an additional insight, which is for whom the model is useful. The infinitude of possible worlds that models can occupy is limited only by our imaginations and credulities. How we arrive at one specific choice from among this limitless array is often a question of ethics and power, just as it is in so much of statistics and science. 
